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A
mAbstract: We estimate a model of labour supply and participation in multiple cash
and in-kind welfare programmes. The modeling exploits a reform that affected U.K.
single mothers. In-work cash entitlements increased under this reform but eligibility
to in-kind child nutrition programmes was lost for some households. When we allow
for differences in the costs associated with each welfare programme we find that in-
work cash and in-work in-kind transfers both have large positive labour supply
effects. There is, however, a utility loss from programme participation which is
estimated to be larger for the cash programme than for the child nutrition
programmes. Our findings imply that the partial cash out of the in-kind transfers
reduced labour supply and suggest that there may be a place in policy portfolios for
in-kind programmes despite their “inefficiency”.
JEL Codes: C31, C35, D12, J22
Keywords: Labour supply, Programme participation, In-kind transfers1. Introduction
This paper is concerned with the effects of cash and in-kind transfers on labour supply
where there are costs associated with the receipt of such transfers. In-kind transfers
are widespread and extensive: housing, childcare and nutrition are commonly provided
in this way. However, despite their widespread use there is very little empirical evi-
dence that addresses the effects of in-kind transfers on labour supply. This is in stark
contrast to the wealth of evidence on the labour supply effects of means-tested cash
transfer programmes.
An important attribute of means-tested programmes is that participation in them is
seldom 100% of the eligible population because of the costs associated with claiming
and/or receiving the transfers. These costs may be real (transactions costs) or psychic
(in the form of stigma), and there may be informational deficiencies that also contrib-
ute to this problem. The costs may be fixed (i.e. independent of the level of eligibility)
or variable. In any event, programme participation is liable to depend on the level of
entitlement and it seems likely that this applies to both cash and in-kind transfers.
In practice, cash transfer programmes are often supplemented by in-kind transfers.
Yet it is often thought that cash is preferable to in-kind transfers on theoretical
grounds. Thus, conventional wisdom has it that cashing out an in-kind programme
would raise the welfare of recipients. It follows that cashing out an in-work in-kind
transfer programme ought to make work more attractive. However, means-tested
transfer programmes impose costs on recipients and the key to understanding why the2013 Bingley and Walker; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
ttribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
edium, provided the original work is properly cited.
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cient in-kind transfers is not cash, but some other programme that gives cash which
has some costs associated with it.
The objective of this paper is to measure the effect of in-kind transfers on labour
supply, relative to cash transfers, allowing for transfer programme non-participation.
We do so by exploiting the observed variation in labour supply of single mothers in
cross-section survey data that is pooled across a number of years that bridge an import-
ant reform to the UK welfare system. The contribution of this paper is that we allow
for differential costs associated with different programmes. In particular, unlike the
existing literature on U.S. food stamps, we do not impose any restriction on the costs
associated with in-kind programmes compared to cash programmes. Our results sug-
gest that, although there is considerable inefficiency with in-kind transfers, participa-
tion in cash transfers can impose even greater costs than the in-kind programmes that
we consider here. Thus, our findings support the idea that in-kind transfers could have
an important place in the portfolio of policy options.
We model the effect on labour supply of several transfer programmes relevant to sin-
gle mothers in the U.K.: Family Credit is an in-work cash transfer; Income Support is
out-of-work cash; Housing Benefit for those with high housing costs and low income;
Welfare Milk Tokens for low income families with pre-school age children; and Free
School Lunches for children of school age in low income families. We exploit a 1988
reform to Family Credit where cash was increased but conditional eligibility to Welfare
Milk Tokens and Free School Lunch was lost.
Here, we adopt structural assumptions on preferences to allow us to identify the
costs, borne by the single mother, associated with each transfer programme and so en-
able us break down the effects of the 1988 reform into those due to changes in cash
programme entitlement levels and those due to changes in the in-kind programme eli-
gibility rules. Our structural model has two advantages over and above a strictly
reduced form approach, such as difference-in-differences, which would only enable us
to describe the gross effects of the reform. First, we are able to quantify the costs
associated with participating in different welfare programmes. Secondly, we can com-
pare the sensitivity of behaviour to variations in earned income across labour market
states with responses to variations in each form of welfare programme income. This
allows us estimate the relative work incentive effects of cash versus in-kind transfers.2. Literature
The existing literature on the effects of in-kind transfers on labour supply is sparse,
despite the heavy expenditures that are devoted to such transfers. Several of the
published papers that are directly concerned with this issue follow Moffitt (1983) and
adopt a structural approach to estimation: Fraker and Moffitt (1988) and Keane and
Moffitt (1998) investigate single mothers, while Hagstrom (1996) considers the effects
on the labour supplies of married couples. Such structural modeling makes explicit
assumptions about the nature of preferences and identifies preference parameters from
variations in budget constraints across households. Each of these papers adopts discrete
choice modeling approaches to labour supply but effectively impose the assumption
that in-kind transfers are equivalent to cash. In addition, most studies assume that
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ure implies that the individual’s choice of labour supply status would rise monotonic-
ally. The implication of this ordering assumption is that if full-time work is preferred to
non-participation, then so too is part-time work. As a result, it is not necessary to make
utility comparisons between all possible alternatives, only adjacent ones. However, if
budget constraints contain non-convexities, as is most often the case for single
mothers, a fall in a preference for leisure might result in an individual switching from
non-participation to full-time work rather than to part-time work.
All recent static labour supply and programme participation research, for example by
Keane and Moffitt (1998), Hoynes (1996), and Brewer et al. (2007), adopt a discrete
choice approach. The first paper uses an ordered probit Random Utility Model. Hoynes
(1996) and later work estimates multinomial logit models and relaxes the Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives restriction by including an additive stochastic term in the util-
ity associated with each possible choice. Hoynes (1996) considers participation in a sin-
gle programme (AFDC-Unemployed Parents) together with husband and wife discrete
choice labour supply.
The structural papers which consider food stamps find that they have small and in-
significant negative effects on labour supplies. 1 In contrast, a recent paper, by Hoynes
and Schanzenbach (2007), which is concerned exclusively with food stamps, exploits
the staggered introduction of the programme across U.S. counties to estimate its effect
using a difference-in-differences methodology. They use the U.S. Panel Study of Income
Dynamics to estimate the effects on hours of work and participation and they find eco-
nomically large, but statistically insignificant, negative effects on the probabilities of
labour force participation. They go on to use the Census data and find economically
small, but statistically significant, negative effects.
Most recently, Manchester and Mumford (2011) develop a structural model of labour
supply and welfare programme participation that they use to estimate the costs
associated with participating in two US in-kind programmes using a sample of single
mothers. They provide estimates of the fixed costs of participating in each programme
separate from the marginal cost for each programme. They find large implied psycho-
logical costs to both programmes. Identification in their model comes entirely from the
structure that they impose and the non-linear budget constraints that individuals face
in their single cross section of data. Our own work parallels this recent US research in
several ways but we exploit variation in the budget constraint across pooled cross
sections that is driven by an important reform for identification.3. Transfer programmes in the U.K.
Income Support is intended to ensure that household incomes do not fall below some
minimum and so is effectively an out-of-work cash transfer programme. For single
parents eligibility to Income Support does not require them to be available or searching
for work: that is Income Support was paid to single parents who were labour market
non-participants as well as those declaring themselves to be unemployed. Entitlement
to Income Support depends on the number and ages of children and it imposes a 100%
implicit tax rate on all sources of household income above some minimal level of earn-
ings. Family Credit was payable to low income families but only if hours of work exceed
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tion of the rent and rates (a local property tax) dependent on income and is something
of a hybrid between cash and in-kind because it was typically paid in cash but with no-
tional hypothecation. Apart from Housing Benefit, the other main means-tested in-kind
transfers are for low income households with children. Free School Lunches are an
in-kind transfer to households with school-aged children. Welfare Milk Tokens are an
in-kind transfer to households with pre-school children2. Welfare Milk Tokens were
available for each child under age 5, and could be exchanged for a pint of milk a day. Free
School Lunches were available for each school-aged child during school days. Hereafter
Free School Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens together are denoted child nutrition
programmes. We choose to group the two nutrition transfers together because they are
similar in nature, they are targeted at children, and are both reformed together. Identi-
fication of their separate effects would have to rely on subsets of households with either
only pre-school children (for milk) or only school age children (for free school lunches).
These subsets would be too small to allow for precise estimation.
While Income Support has an unambiguously negative effect on work incentives, Fam-
ily Credit exhibits a notch in the budget constraint, at the minimum level of hours for eli-
gibility, which increases the probability of working this level of hours (although, because
Family Credit is means tested, it may act as a disincentive to working longer hours). Prior
to the 1988 reform both Income Support and Family Credit recipients were eligible for
child nutrition programmes. Post-reform only Income Support participants were entitled,
whereas Family Credit participants received cash but no child nutrition programme eligi-
bility. The 1988 reform also involved an expansion of Family Credit so that cash entitle-
ment levels were typically higher by approximately two thirds: average awards were
around £15 per week prior to the reform and £25 after.
To clarify the way in which Income Support, Family Credit, and the child nutrition
programmes might affect labour supply, Figure 1 shows a characterization of a possible
budget constraint – the precise shapes will depend on a variety of circumstances such
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Figure 1 Stylized Budget Constraint.
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owner occupied accommodation) and we ignore income taxation and social security
contributions. The dashed line from the origin (A-F) represents the budget constraint
in the absence of the welfare programmes, with slope equal to the wage rate. The bold
line A-B-C-D-E-F is the budget constraint with cash transfers pre-reform. A-B is the
level of Income Support entitlement at zero hours of work. B-C is flat because Income
Support is means-tested with a withdrawal rate of 100%. When hours reach 24, Income
Support entitlement ceases and Family Credit becomes payable with an entitlement
given by the vertical distance C-D. As hours and earnings increase, Family Credit is
withdrawn at 70% along D-E until entitlement is exhausted at point E. E-F is beyond
the welfare system. Pre-reform Free School Lunches and Welfare Milk Tokens are
associated with both Income Support and Family Credit and the monetary value of
these are denoted by the dashed-dotted lines.
The reform affects both cash and in-kind transfers above 24 hours of work. The post-
reform cash transfer budget line is denoted A-B-C-D’-E’-F. Changes to the cash budget
line are given by the dashed line. Family Credit became somewhat more generous as
denoted by C-D’, and was withdrawn at 50% along D’-E’. Crucially, in-kind transfers
were lost for those on Family Credit. The monetary value of this loss is denoted by the
dashed-dotted line above 24 hours. In-kind transfers are now only associated with In-
come Support and the monetary value of this is unchanged and is denoted by the hori-
zontal dashed-dotted line below 24 hours. Of course, in practice, Housing Benefit,
income tax and social security contribution systems overlay this figure and causes add-
itional complexities which we ignore in this stylized diagram. However the figure
conveys the essential two elements of this in-work transfer reform: an increase in cash
generosity and the loss of in-kind transfers above 24 hours.
Official figures based on Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data (see Department of
Social Security (1993, 1998)) for single parent Family Credit programme participation
in 1987 are not available although the total figure for couples and single parents to-
gether was 51% of eligible cases (so-called, caseload take-up). Earlier unofficial figures
in Fry and Stark (1993) are similar. Subsequent Family Credit official statistics were
based on the FES data pooled over successive pairs of years and the figure for 1990/91
(1991/1992) is 62% (66%). Comparable 1987 figures for Housing Benefit and Income
Support are 69% and 95% respectively. Clearly Housing Benefit and Family Credit have
a more serious "take-up" problem than Income Support, and this motivates our ap-
proach of modeling Family Credit and Housing Benefit programme participation but
assuming Income Support entitlements are always received. There are no official
figures for child nutrition programme participation.
Family Credit was a welfare programme and not part of the income tax system.
Claiming Family Credit involved completing a (long and detailed) form every 6 months
and verifying earnings by producing three consecutive monthly (or seven weekly) pay
slips. Employers were contacted to verify that applicants met the minimum hours con-
dition if that was not apparent from the pay slips. Asset information was also required
but, at least for single parents, this usually involved no more than stating that one did
not have financial assets which exceeded a specific large value.
Housing Benefit was complicated because it was administered by local government
offices rather than the welfare authorities, each with slightly different claim procedures
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books” or tenancy agreements that would serve this purpose. New applications had to
be made whenever circumstances changed.
Claiming Income Support usually involved an interview at a local office of the De-
partment of Social Security, where applicants were asked about their detailed
circumstances and expected to produce substantiating documentation. Income Support
for single mothers did not require that they were “available for work” so, unlike the
case of the long-term unemployed, there was no requirement to “sign on” (periodically
declare that one was available for work) at the local office of the Department for Em-
ployment. Income Support, Family Credit and (most of ) Housing Benefit, at the time,
were paid directly into a bank account or, for those without an account, by mailing a
“giro” cheque that could be cashed at Post Offices.
In contrast, in-kind transfers, because they were conditional on cash benefit receipt,
simply required that applicants complete a short form detailing the number and ages of
their children and verify that they were in receipt of Income Support (or also Family
Credit prior to the 1988 reform). Welfare Milk Tokens were small colored plastic disks
which could be exchanged for milk in shops, or with doorstep delivery services, and
authorized sellers were then reimbursed by the Department of Health. They were even-
tually replaced by books of vouchers. Over this period, schools maintained a list of Free
School Lunch eligible children, and would issue them with lunch tickets each week. In-
eligible children had to buy their tickets at school each week.
The major distinguishing feature of claiming cash programme entitlements is the high
costs of claiming, as indicated above, compared to the small additional costs of claiming
an associated in-kind transfer. Moreover, it seems likely that in the majority of cases the
only agents who knew that individuals were receiving cash transfers were the recipients
themselves and government officials, while knowledge of in-kind transfer receipt was po-
tentially shared with local shop assistants, in the case of Welfare Milk Tokens, and with
teachers and peers at school, in the case of Free School Lunches. It seems likely that non-
participation in the cash programmes by those who were eligible was largely driven by im-
perfect information and the transaction costs of claiming. In contrast, it seems likely that
in-kind transfers may have low value for the user, in addition to any stigma, but have rela-
tively low information/transaction costs for the claimant. In the case of Free School
Lunches it seems likely that the burden of any stigma is largely borne by the child. While
we refer to stigma in what follows in principle we do not rely on this interpretation of the
costs – our argument is that programmes may be differentially effective because of these
costs, whatever their nature.
We allow programme participation to depend on the level of programme
entitlements to capture the idea of “fixed cost stigma” in the terminology of Moffitt
(1983). Moreover, our model does not require that we impose additive separability be-
tween labour supply and programme participation and it is this that allows us to cap-
ture “variable cost stigma”.4. Family expenditure survey data
Our data consist of 15 pooled cross-sections of the UK Family Expenditure Surveys
(FES) from April 1978 to March 1992. 3 The FES is a continuous household survey that
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graphic information, as well as spending patterns. Over this period, the sample size is
typically around seven thousand responding households and the response rate is
around 70%. Our focus is on single mothers, that is, those living alone with their
dependent children, because they are a major client group for welfare programmes in
the UK and, in doing so, we abstract from intra-household distributional issues that
would complicate any analysis of couples. Our sample of single mothers who are heads
of household consists of 4527 observations from these 15 pooled cross-sections.
We compute eligibility and the level of entitlement from a very detailed routine that
acknowledges all relevant features of the tax, welfare and social security contribution
systems including in-kind transfers. 4 The labour supply data is the response to a ques-
tion about “usual” weekly hours. 5 We divide the observed data into groups according
to weekly hours of work as: unemployed (UE), defined as usual hours are less than 10
and economic position (labour market status) coded as "searching for work"; non-
participants (NP), defined as having weekly hours of work less than 10 6 and not
searching for work; lower part-time (LPT) defined as an employee with weekly hours
ranging from 10 to 19; higher part-time (HPT) are employees with weekly hours from
20 to 29; and full-time (FT) are employees with weekly hours 30+.
Our analysis centres on the expansion of Family Credit together with the loss of in-
kind transfers in 1988 and Table 1 shows some summary statistics broken down by
pre/post reform. There is a clear fall in positive hours from 41% to 32%. This would be
consistent with child nutrition in-kind transfers having low stigma compared to theTable 1 Sample means (Standard deviations)
Pre April 1988 Post March 1988 All
Prob Hours>0 0.406 0.324 0.375
Prob Hours>0 | child 0-4 0.154 0.176 0.163
Prob Hours>0 | no child 0-4 0.501 0.437 0.484
Hours | Hours>0 26.4 (12.5) 25.3 (13.7) 26.0 (13.0)
Own age 35.5 (9.1) 33.1 (8.4) 34.6 (8.9)
# Children aged 0-4 0.37 (0.62) 0.53 (0.69) 0.43 (0.65)
# Children aged 5-10 0.57 (0.73) 0.62 (0.77) 0.59 (0.75)
# Children aged 11-16 0.74 (0.83) 0.52 (0.72) 0.66 (0.80)
Renter 0.57 0.68 0.61
Widow 0.11 0.05 0.09
Income Support participation 0.52 0.64 0.57
Family Credit participation 0.06 0.07 0.06
Housing Benefit participation 0.18 0.18 0.18
Child nutrition prog. participation 0.50 0.55 0.51
Income Support | Income Support>0 38.22 (14.26) 57.06 (24.57) 46.04 (21.34)
Family Credit | Family Credit>0 12.65 (7.83) 31.29 (17.39) 20.09 (15.51)
Housing Benefit | Housing Benefit>0 28.88 (33.53) 31.34 (20.12) 30.23 (27.05)
Child nutrition | CH>0 2.63 (2.03) 2.69 (1.31) 2.65 (1.83)
# Observations 2906 1621 4527
Source: FES data. Sample of single mother heads of household April 1978 to March 1992. Notes: Welfare figures are the
levels of receipts conditional on receipt and are £ per week in 1992 prices. Child nutrition programme figures are the
levels of receipt evaluated at market prices of milk and school meals as recorded in this FES data.
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single mothers are younger post-reform, their children are younger, and there has been
a growth in the proportion renting. These changes reflect the changing drivers of single
motherhood over the period – there was a dramatic drop in the proportion of widows
where mothers and their children tended to be older and live in the family-owned
home; towards young never partnered and middle-aged separated and divorcees who
would often move into rented accommodation if they were not already renting. The fall
in positive hours is driven by mothers with a youngest child of school age. There was a
reduction in hours of work, conditional on participation: something we would expect if
the income effect of the larger cash entitlements dominates the substitution effect
associated with lowering the phase-out rate of Family Credit from 70% to 50%, and/or
if there was significant costs associated with child nutrition programmes – but such a
fall in hours is also consistent with having younger children, for example.
Figure 2 shows the usual weekly hours of work distributions (in 4-hour bin widths)
both before and after the 1988 reform. As also shown in Table 1, there is an increase in
the proportion with zero hours, and this is largely at the expense of full time work.
Hourly data (not shown) exhibits reporting modes at multiples of 10 and 5 hours, and
there is a pronounced spike at 24 which is the minimum hours of work requirement
for receiving Family Credit. Figure 3 confirms the rise in non-participation and the fall
in full-time work that is reflected in Table 1 and Figure 2 and shows no dramatic
changes around the reform. This is also true when the sample is split by youngest child
of school age (not shown).
Programme participation is summarized in Table 2 where the data is divided
according to our definition of labour force status. The table uses usual weekly income
and hours worked data to compute which households are entitled to which transfers,
and uses recorded receipt to indicate who is receiving. The "take-up" rate ofUsual weekly hours distribution












Figure 2 Usual weekly hours distribution.
Variations in Labour Market Status (proportions)
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Figure 3 Variations in labour market status (proportions).
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eligible for some non-zero amount) are computed to be 45.4% for Family Credit, 58.4%
for Housing Benefit and 85.6% for child nutrition programmes (conditional on receiv-
ing the associated cash transfer). Post reform take-up rates for child nutrition
programmes and Family Credit are 9% and 3% higher, but Housing Benefit take-up is
unchanged. As is to be expected there are significant numbers of participants who are
apparently ineligible - indicated by rows where individuals are receiving (Receiving = Y)
but not entitled (Entitled = N) for mismeasurement reasons. 7
Households could be in receipt of multiple transfers. The importance of multiple trans-
fer receipt (ignoring calculated entitlement), for the welfare programmes we consider here
is shown in Table 3 where we break down receipt of the various combinations ofTable 2 Labour supply, transfer programme eligibility and participation
Transfer programme status Labour market status
Programme Receiving Entitled UE NP LPT HPT FT All
Family N N 234 2527 317 228 670 3976
Credit N Y 32 0 0 75 136 243
Y N 4 25 25 16 36 106
Y Y 5 0 0 77 120 202
Child N N 79 539 172 261 769 1820
nutrition N Y 35 241 18 25 36 355
Y N 9 114 23 27 79 252
Y Y 152 1658 129 83 78 2100
Housing N N 233 2349 260 215 246 3303
Benefit N Y 17 87 34 54 175 367
Y N 11 52 21 39 217 340
Y Y 14 64 27 88 324 517
275 2552 342 396 962 4527
Source: FES data. Sample of single mother heads of household April 1978 to March 1992. Note: UE=unemployed (defined
as zero usual hours and economic position "searching for work"); NP=non-participants (hours<10 and not searching);
LPT=lower part time (hours 10–19); HPT=higher part time (hours 20–29); and FT=full time (hours>29). Income Support is
excluded from the table because of its very high take-up rate and it is available only to UE, NP and LPT status.
Table 3 Labour supply and multiple transfer receipt
Programme participation Labour market status
Child nutrition Housing benefit Family credit UE NP LPT HPT FT All
N N N 75 566 93 120 299 1153
N N Y 1 3 4 18 38 64
N Y N 36 207 79 113 402 837
Y N N 154 1717 134 59 54 2118
N Y Y 2 4 14 35 66 121
Y N Y 6 7 2 18 19 52
Y Y N 1 37 11 11 51 111
Y Y Y 0 11 5 22 33 71
275 2552 342 396 962 4527
Source: FES data. Sample of single mother heads of household April 1978 to March 1992. Note: Income Support receipt is
not included in this table – all of those whose status is UE or NP will be eligible for Income Support and are invariably
observed to be receiving Income Support. UE=unemployed (defined as zero usual hours and economic position
"searching for work"); NP=non-participants (hours<10 and not searching); LPT=lower part time (hours 10–19); HPT=higher
part time (hours 20–29); and FT=full time (hours>29).
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frequent post-reform (not shown) because Family Credit no longer gives eligibility to child
nutrition programmes.
We omit Income Support from the table because the take-up rate is close to 100%
and we therefore treat it as equivalent to non-transfer income for modeling purposes.
The sample proportions receiving 3, 2, 1 and 0 transfers (excluding Income Support)
are respectively 1.6, 6.3, 66.7 and 25.4%. While the data appears to be dominated by
individuals receiving just a single transfer this is because of the low level of labour mar-
ket participation. We would expect to find multiple transfer receipt for those in-work
while those who are unemployed or non-participants will be on Income Support only. 8
The sample proportions entitled to multiple transfers are much higher. 95. Econometric framework
We follow much of the literature on modeling the labour supply of low-income
households in approximating the continuous hours of work data by a choice among
discrete alternatives. Like Hoynes (1996) and Brewer et al. (2007), we allow for unordered
labour supply choices, but we do not adopt the logit with mixing to avoid IIA but rather
use the multinomial probit. That is, like Keane and Moffitt (1998) we adopt a probit speci-
fication, but we do not restrict it to be ordered. Like Hoynes (1996) and Brewer et al.
(2007) we also allow for unobserved heterogeneity through random parameters. While
our Random Utility Model unordered probit approach would not scale up to a larger
choice set with the same ease as those based on a multinomial logit framework, it has at
least the same degree of flexibility for the problem at hand. Furthermore, we control for
the fact that some of those not working would rather be employed – i.e. they are un-
employed. This seems particularly important since our data covers a period when there
was widespread unemployment: aggregate unemployment rates reached 10% in the mid
1980’s, fell to around 7% in the late 1980’s and started to rise again after that.
There are four elements to our empirical model: the constraint, the specification of
preferences, the specification of take-up that embeds assumptions about costs, and
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cuss each element in turn.
The income levels associated with each state constitute the constraint which
contributes to the determination of the choice of labour market state. Since we only
observe the one alternative that is chosen, we need to predict incomes for each state
from the income in the observed state. It would be computationally demanding to esti-
mate the incomes associated with each labour market alternative jointly with the choice
among alternatives. Since we only require consistent predictions of wages in order to
estimate the determinants of each state, we adopt a two-step procedure. In the first
step we estimate full-time and part-time wage equations which use a reduced form for
labour market status to control for the endogeneity of hours and use these estimates to
predict incomes in the part-time and full-time states. 10 Income for non-participants is
computed from the welfare system and observed unearned (non-transfer) income. For
participants, we compute the levels of tax liability and transfer entitlement using these
predicted earnings at the specific discrete levels of hours of work.
The budget constraint is approximated by just four discrete labour supply
alternatives: non-participation (NP), low hours part-time (LPT), high hours part time
(HPT) and full-time (FT) 11 in combination with three transfer programmes: Family
Credit, Housing Benefit and in-kind transfers to children. We model the choice be-
tween 32 alternatives. These are combinations of 4 labour market states and participa-
tion in each of three transfer programmes (2*2*2). The 8 possible programme
participation combinations, across the 4 labour market states yields the 32 alternatives.
Since each alternative is a composite of a labour supply state and a combination of
programme participations, we maintain this structure in the decision modeling. 12
In the second step, we estimate the random utility model using the predicted incomes
in each state. 13 The second element of the model is preferences. Here choices between
these alternatives are driven by differences in the utilities attached to them. Consistency
with choice theory implies that we determine all 31 utility differences (8 alternatives
involve unemployment which we do not regard as a distinct choice driven by utility
maximizing considerations). Let p index each programme in the set of programmes
P = {Housing Benefit, Family Credit, child nutrition programmes}. Participation in
each separate programme is indicated by categorical indicators Tp, which together com-
pose the complete programme participation vector Τps ¼ THB;TFC ;TCHð Þ′ where
HB = Housing Benefit, and FC = Family Credit. Hence labour supply hs and participa-
tion in programmes Τps completely characterize a state, s.






where y pis is
the income associated with the programmes P, y0is is other income (effectively Income
Support and earned income, which we pool because the participation rate in the In-
come Support programme is so close to unity) 14 , and X is a vector of individual
characteristics. Now consider a statistical specification which allows for random vari-
ation in behavior due to an additive disturbance and to variation in tastes,






, where Uis is unobservable utility of state s for individual i,
and εis is an alternative specific random error term. Thus, the utility gain of moving
from alternative s to t is:
Uis  Uit≡U y0is; his; ypis;Tpis;X; εis
  U y0it ; hit ; ypit ;Tpit ;X; εit  ð1Þ
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individuals. This is a rather general specification since it allows for the possibility that
the effect of entitlement on programme participation and the effect of each type of in-
come on labour supply might differ across X and both p and s. Of course, this is far too
general to be practical even though some of the types of income are not available in
some of the s because of the nature of the welfare rules. Thus, we assume (as seems
reasonable) that programme participation decisions over p should be affected by X and
by its level of entitlement, y p, and not by the entitlement to any other programme or
by one’s labour market state (except insofar as entitlement varies across s). It also seems
reasonable that labour supply choices should depend on X and on levels of receipt of
each type of income and not on programme participation per se.
Thus, we assume that labour supply is a function (which is allowed to vary across
hours) of individual characteristics (which are fixed irrespective of hours), and a func-
tion (which is fixed across hours, but varies across programmes) of characteristics of al-
ternative combinations of programmes and hours (which vary across hours and
programmes). In other words, labour supply is a function of individual-specific
characteristics and alternative-specific characteristics. In particular, hours comparisons
are a function of demographics and incomes. As usual in this class of model, only the
utility differences between the number of alternatives minus one can be identified.
Since, we are implicitly assuming that the decision to participate in a programme
affects welfare in the same way for all comparisons of labour market states, then utility
differences between labour supply states can be expressed as
Uis  Uit≡g yisyitð Þψi þ Xiωst þ εis  εitð Þ ð2Þ
where here g(yis - yit) is assumed to be linear
15 , and ψ = (ψHB,ψFC, ψCH,ψ0)0, with
ψpi ¼ ψp þ eψpi , is a matrix of parameters of functions of differences in the levels of each
type of income across pairs of states (from HB = Housing Benefit, FC = Family Credit
and CH = child nutrition transfer programmes ypis
 
and other sources (y0is, which is In-
come Support and other non-transfer income)). That is, the programme participation
decisions difference out of this expression. 16 We think of the ψ p’s as capturing the
value that individuals attach to variations in differences in the p-type of income
differences relative to ψ0 which captures the effects of wage income on the choice of
state. In particular, we think of ψCH as capturing the discount that the individual applies
to the market value of the in-kind transfers. ψ reflects the mean tastes of the sample whileeψi is a coefficient which shows how i differs from the mean individual, and (εis − εit) is an
additive disturbance assumed to be i.i.d. across i but not necessarily across s. The εis term
captures taste variation (or unobserved attributes of alternatives) that is uncorrelated with
the income levels – that is purely random variation. The interpretation of the parameters
ωst is the gain (or loss) in utility from comparing the alternative s to the alternative t,
where the latter choice is the reference, when one has the characteristics X.
To summarize, from equation (2), the probability of observing i in labour market
state s is given by
Pr Uis > U

it
  ¼ Pr g yis  yitð Þψi þ Xiωst > εit  εisð Þ½  ∀s≠t ð3Þ
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functions (which do not vary across hours) of individual and programme characteristics:
specifically, demographic variables and the levels of entitlement. Consequently
programme participation can vary with labour market state, as does entitlement and eligi-
bility. In particular, an individual i, in labour market state s will participate in transfer
programme p if it offers a utility gain. This is assumed to be determined by the following
latent and observed programme participation (take-up) equations:









where Tpis is the latent variable corresponding to observed take-up T
p
is of a transfer
programme p (Housing Benefit, Family Credit, Chuld nutrition), which we define to be
unity if i is observed to be participating in the programme p and zero otherwise; Vpi is a
vector of individual characteristics which do not vary across labour market states; βp is a
corresponding vector of parameters; ypis is transfer entitlement which may vary across
labour market states; γ p is an associated coefficient and ηpis is a random error.
The final element of the model is the relationship between labour supply and
programme incomes which is established through the functions, g(.,.). Labour market
status choices are made on the basis of these income differences, amongst other things.
These differences are decomposed into Housing Benefit, Family Credit, child nutrition
programmes and other (Income Support and non-transfer) income differences separ-
ately. Other income is differenced directly, whereas the differences in programme
incomes are the differences in the programme participation indices, which are, in turn,
a function of entitlement levels. It is straightforward to show that when comparing
labour market states s and t, the difference in programme participation indices between
states turns out to be a function of entitlement differences only. That is,
Tpis  Tpit ≡ Ypis  Ypit
 
γp þ ηpis  ηpit
  ð5Þ
It is evident from equation (5) that Tp has the dimension of income, and can beis
interpreted accordingly. Restricting programme participation to be a function of size of
programme entitlements captures the idea of “fixed cost stigma” in the terminology of
Moffitt (1983). This fixed cost depends on individual demographic characteristics, Vpi ,
so that “fixed cost stigma” varies with observed characteristics. Because programme
participation is discrete it must be the case that programme participation decisions can
only identify fixed costs.
However, our model does not require that we impose additive separability between
labour supply and programme participation. 17 Indeed, imposing the restriction ψp = 0
allows a direct test of separability between labour supply and receipt of each type of
programme income. It is this feature that allows us to capture the “variable stigma
costs” that arise because, conditional on programme participation, the level of each
type of income matters for labour supply and welfare. Allowing for fixed and variable
cost stigma with multiple programmes is an innovation of our work. Furthermore, eψpi
allows taste heterogeneity to vary across types of income.
The model is complex, so it is useful to summarize the restrictions we have put on
the labour supply and programme participation model so as to place these in the con-
text of the literature. We assume that participation in a programme is a function of
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from any other programme). This function does not vary across labour market states
and while demographics do not vary across state, programme income does. Hence we
obtain a programme participation index which varies across labour market states
according to this function of entitlement. Exploiting the nature of the choice set and
restricting programme participation functions makes the problem much more tractable
without imposing further restrictions on preferences or functional form. For example,
Family Credit eligibility is restricted to those in work, and child nutrition programme
eligibility is restricted to Income Support recipients and to pre-reform Family Credit
recipients.
The relationship between labour supply and programme participation comes through
differences in incomes and functions of entitlements. We assume multivariate normality
of the error terms and allow additional flexibility by estimating random coefficients on
income differences. The novelty of our empirical approach is that: we allow taste het-
erogeneity through random coefficients; we nest additive separability of labour supply
and programme participation, but impose only a minimal economic structure on the
data. Details concerning stochastic specification and likelihood contributions are avail-
able online and on request from the authors.
The labour supply parameters are identified because there are households without
eligibility to any transfers at any employment status: largely because they have high
wages and/or unearned (non-transfer) incomes that imply zero entitlements even at
low hours of work (recall that we exclude Income Support as a choice on the grounds
that the take-up rate is close to 100%). The labour supply choice itself is distinguished
from unemployment rationing by the exclusion of the regional unemployment rate
from the labour supply functions and through joint normality. Identification of the
determinants of participation in the various programmes is achieved through exogen-
ous variation in eligibilities and entitlements. For example, time series variation in real
housing costs are important in affecting Housing Benefit entitlement, and the variation
in real school lunch and milk prices determine the market value of child nutrition
entitlements. For both Family Credit and child nutrition programmes we exploit the fact
that the data spans the reform in 1988: Family Credit entitlements were increased and
associated in-kind transfers lost. Thus, our method uses both step changes associated with
the policy reform and the time series variation in entitlements that using 15 years of data
allows. In estimation we pool 15 years of cross-sections, and assume preferences are stable
over the period having controlled for the observed drivers of sample composition and be-
havior described in Table 1, together with year and region effects.6. Estimates
Model estimates are presented in Table 4. The labour supply and rationing equations
(upper pane) and programme participation equations (lower pane) are estimated simul-
taneously. It is convenient to discuss each pane in turn as the nature of the two sets of
dependent variables is different, and interpretation differs accordingly. 18
In the top pane, the labour supply model has two types of explanatory variable:
alternative-specific variables (i.e. income differences) and alternative invariant variables
(i.e. demographics). For income differences we estimate a coefficient mean and a
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parameters in the model) and for demographics we estimate only a coefficient mean
(indicated by Fixed). 19
Consider the fixed parameters in the labour supply model. A negative sign implies
that a variable is associated with decreasing the probability of choosing between one
state and another. For example, a negative coefficient on Widow in the LPT→NP equa-
tion means that being a widow makes one less likely to prefer a labour market status of
non-participation than a status on lower part-time, compared to the default singleTable 4 Estimates of labour supply, unemployment and programme participation
Labour supply LPT→NP HPT→NP FT→NP Unemployment
Fixed
intercept 0.961 0.188 0.893 0.521 1.085 0.661 −1.040 0.228
renter 0.187 0.028 0.009 0.035 0.046 0.019 0.261 0.039
Age −0.043 0.894 −0.269 0.717 −0.963 0.448 −1.805 1.107
age2 −0.126 1.168 0.261 0.897 1.425 0.662 −0.203 1.468
child 0-4 0.235 0.087 0.487 0.241 0.155 0.067 0.230 0.045
child 5-10 −0.075 0.037 0.046 0.034 0.077 0.036 0.087 0.030
widow −0.147 0.035 0.027 0.040 0.060 0.030 −0.146 0.052
Unemp % 0.009 0.092
Random ψp eψp
yother 4.474 0.211 1.049 0.049
yother - yFC 0.322 0.154 0.980 0.399
yother - yHB 0.008 0.025 0.598 0.400
yother - yCH 0.484 0.219 1.000 0.550
Covariance LPT→NP HPT→NP FT→NP
ρLPT->NP 0.091 0.090 0.445 0.060
ρHPT->NP −0.699 0.092
σ 1.000 - 0.560 0.560 0.232 0.196
Programme participation FC HB CH
intercept −1.055 1.205 −0.469 0.908 0.102 0.572
renter 0.448 0.231 - 0.626 0.115
age −0.048 0.588 −0.317 0.439 0.019 0.297
age2 −0.042 0.777 −0.359 0.547 −0.347 0.414
child 0-4 −0.123 0.229 0.232 0.190 0.369 0.125
child 5-10 −0.082 0.156 0.092 0.117 0.089 0.105
widow −1.451 0.664 0.252 0.135 −0.258 0.201
unemp. rate 0.565 0.181 0.459 0.131 −0.008 0.085
yp 0.069 0.036 0.279 0.090 0.074 0.005
Covariance
ρCH −0.220 0.154 0.211 0.114
ρFC 0.435 0.123 −0.220 0.154
Source: Author estimates.
Note: Standard errors in italics. Log likelihood −6825. Number of observations is 4527. The labour supply and
unemployment equations also include 8 region dummies and 7 dummies for consecutive pairs of benefit years.
FC = Family Credit; HB = Housing Benefit; CH = child nutrition programme, Renter is not included in HB participation
equation since HB is only available for renters. Age is defined as age/100 and age2/1000 and the unemployment rate, as
a %, has been divided by 10. Note that all observations are single mothers so the omitted demographic profile is a never
partnered or separated mother in owner occupied accommodation whose youngest child is 11–18.
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remarking on. The presence of young children aged 5–10 reduces the full time prob-
ability, and pre-school aged children reduce the probability of working any positive
hours (both relative to the omitted category where the youngest child is aged 11–16).
The coefficients in the HPT→NP equation are not as well determined, though they are
significantly different from the corresponding coefficients in the other comparisons
with non-participation.
The interpretation of the random parameters on alternative-specific variables is more
direct. This tells us of the impact of the difference in the income variable between
states on the probability of being in any state. A positive sign on an income type vari-
able implies that states with larger values of that income are preferred to those with
smaller values. The positive coefficient, ψ , on an income difference implies that more
of that income is preferred to less. As well as estimating the mean of the income differ-
ence coefficients, the variance, indicated by eψi , is also estimated to allow for taste
heterogeneity.
Income difference coefficients are estimated by programme. These programme in-
come differences arise through differences in ypi across different states, where p is Fam-
ily Credit, child nutrition programmes or Housing Benefit. Family Credit and Housing
Benefit are cash, and for child nutrition programmes we use the market value of the
transfer. Since the demographic variables are alternative-invariant, what remains is a
function of transfer entitlement only. These functions are comparable across
programmes, and our estimates imply that Family Credit entitlement has less of a
labour supply effect than child nutrition entitlement has, and Housing Benefit does not
appear to have a different effect on labour supply than variation in other income. There
is no reform to Housing Benefit, and identification relies on variation in real housing
costs over time and across regions because the Housing Benefit formula was typically
just up-rated with inflation. On the face of it, our results imply that Housing Benefit,
although suffering from fixed stigma, seems to be close to cash, conditional on Housing
Benefit participation.
Other (Income Support and non-transfer) income enters into the labour supply func-
tion directly. We can put the yother coefficient into some perspective by calculating the im-
plied utility gain associated with an additional pound of other income at 0.0447 (4.474/
100). Furthermore, the utility loss associated with working lower part time, higher part
time, full time is 0.92, 1.06, 1.27 respectively, on average for the sample. We can compute
a money metric of these utility differences from the mean effect of other income on utility.
This values the loss in welfare from moving from labour force non-participation to lower
part time at £20.56 (i.e. 0.92/0.0447) with a standard deviation of 5.14; and to higher part
time at £23.69 (1.56); and to full time at £28.38 (4.47). The results suggest that the canon-
ical economic model of labour supply is supported by the data: there is a utility gain from
income and a utility loss from working that increases with hours of work – there is noth-
ing in the econometric model that imposes such results.
When it comes to welfare income we can compare the utility gain from an extra £1
of welfare entitlement (or an extra £1 of receipt conditional on programme participa-
tion), with an extra £1 of other income. For example, the effect of £1 of extra Family
Credit entitlement is zero unless it triggers programme participation in which case it is
4.152 (= 4.474 - 0.3223) – which, in money metric terms, is approximately £0.93 (i.e.
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triggers programme participation is the marginal effect of entitlement of 0.03 (0.069 x
0.45, the take-up rate). Thus, the expected impact on someone not taking up is just
0.125 (3% of 4.152), worth £0.03. The overall expected impact is 0.03 for the 55% not
taking up and 0.93 for those who are – on average an effect of approximately £0.44.
Similarly £1 of child nutrition has no effect unless it triggers programme participation in
which case the effect is 3.9 – in money metric terms approximately £0.87, which is what
it is for those already taking up. While the expected impact is just 0.25 (6% of 3.9) –
which, in money metric terms, is approximately £0.06 for someone not taking up.
Therefore, the overall average effect, across the 15% who are not taking up and the 85%
who are, is £0.74. Importantly, our results indicate that Family Credit is valued less than
child nutrition programmes.
The results suggest that the underlying economic model is supported by the data: there
are significant fixed cost stigma associated with programme participation and variable
cost stigma associated with spending each £1 of welfare income. Further support for the
choice of modeling framework is given by the significant correlations between the
unobservables in the choice equations. Significant random parameters on the income
functions support our random utility approach to accommodate taste heterogeneity.
In the lower pane of Table 4 the programme participation results are presented. Par-
ticipation in each transfer programme is a positive and significant function of entitle-
ment level. The unrestricted correlation structure which we allow across programme
participation unobservables appears to be appropriate. Unobservable determinants of
Housing Benefit participation are positively correlated with both Family Credit partici-
pation and with child nutrition programme participation but the unobservable
determinants of Family Credit and child nutrition programmes are uncorrelated with
each other. This latter finding is surprising since Family Credit gives rise to eligibility
for the latter in 20% of cases in our data. A possible explanation is that those with In-
come Support, who are mainly out of work, have quite different unobserved
characteristics. This result suggests that the nature of child nutrition transfers and their
take-up is distinctive: perhaps, not surprising, since the stigma, at least in the case of
Free School Lunches, is directly borne by the children.
A direct test of separability between programme participation and labour supply is a
test of the significance of the programme participation indices in the labour supply
functions. These tests indicate that labour supply and programme participation per se
are non-separable. Non-separability is a feature of Family Credit and child nutrition
programmes but not of Housing Benefit.
Ideally one would like to be able to evaluate the model by seeing how well it
simulates actual events in the data, such as welfare reforms. Unfortunately, although
we have a reasonably large sample we still rely on post-reform cell sizes that are some-
times quite small. Thus, there is little prospect for being able to estimate over
sub-samples of the data. Moreover, we cannot treat the post-reform data as a hold-out
sample to see how well the model simulates the reform, because we rely on the reform
for identification. However, we can see how well the estimates enable us to track the
data over time. In Figure 4 we show the predicted effects of demographic changes and
the budget constraints that occurred across the reform. It is clear that the increase in
the proportion of single mothers with young children, that has a large negative effect
The effects of the reform and demographic changes on labour supply (%) 
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Figure 4 The effects of the reform and demographic changes on labour supply (%).
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labour market participation. That is, the change in demographics that were occurring
over time would have implied a large increase in non-participation. However, despite
the intention to increase labour supply, our estimates imply that this would, controlling
for demographics, have actually been reduced even further by the reform itself. In
Figure 5 we go on to compare the predicted post reform labour supply pattern with the
observed post-reform pattern. This comparison shows that we are overestimating the
extent of post-reform participation and, correspondingly, under-predicting post-reform
full-time and higher part-time participation rates, although the discrepancies are rela-
tively small compared to the observed change in behavior over time.
A more transparent way to examine the implications of the estimated parameters
is to define a representative individual and simulate the effects of changing some of
her characteristics. Our representative woman has median or modal values for allPost-reform goodness of fit (%)
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Figure 5 Post-reform goodness of fit (%).
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Support), £115, £130, £145 at non-participation, lower part time, higher part time, full
time respectively; has zero eligibility for Family Credit, Housing Benefit or child nutri-
tion programmes in any labour market state; lives in rented accommodation; has a
youngest child at secondary school (aged 11–16); faces a local unemployment rate of
5%; and lives in the South East in 1992. The simulation exercise performed in Table 5
shows the response of participation in Housing Benefit, Family Credit and child nutri-
tion programmes to changes in the levels of entitlements of each programme and to
demographics. The first line is the simulated programme participation probability for
our reference single mother and the subsequent three rows show how this changes in
response to a £10 increase in the level of entitlement for each programme. The bold
figures show the “own” effects of entitlement on participation probability - thus £10 of
extra child nutrition entitlement raises the probability of participation by almost 9%
compared to the 84% reference level. Housing Benefit and child nutrition programme
participation respond most to increasing level of entitlement. Family Credit is only one
third as responsive as Housing Benefit, despite the same low reference levels. Subse-
quent rows show the effect of changes in the definition of the reference single mother:
adding a young child, for example.
In a similar way, we simulate labour supply responses in Table 6 for the same repre-
sentative individual. That variable stigma costs have important consequences for labour
supply incentives is clear from comparing the responses to the various transfer incomes
with the response to other income, Y. The bold figures here show the effects of raising
each type of income in a given labour market state on the probability of being in that
state. That is, comparing the effect of different kinds of incomes on labour market sta-
tus reveals the relative effects of the costs associated with different benefits. Other (In-
come Support and non-transfer) income has the largest effects: £10 added to income at
labour force non-participation increases the non-participation probability by almost 6%
from 31%, while £10 of Family Credit income would increase the probability by justTable 5 Programme participation simulations for a representative individual % expected
and expected change by state
Variable Programme
CH Housing benefit Family credit
Reference 84.42 40.89 41.61
CH + £10 8.76 0.00 −0.01
HB + £10 0.01 10.75 0.01
FC + £10 0.01 0.01 3.16
owner −19.80 0.00 −13.87
age + 10 −0.35 −1.77 −1.45
unemp. + 1% −0.22 1.85 2.05
child 0-4 7.39 10.12 −5.02
child 5-10 2.19 3.81 −3.14
widow −10.23 −9.48 −25.42
Source: Author calculations.
Note: FC = Family Credit; HB = Housing Benefit, CH = child nutrition programmes. The representative individual has a
weekly income (in 1992 prices) of £105, £115, £130, £145 at NP, lower part time, higher part time, full time respectively;
has zero eligibility for FC, HB or CH; lives in rented accommodation; has a youngest child at secondary school (aged
11–18); faces a local unemployment rate of 5%; and lives in the South East in 1992.
Table 6 Labour supply simulations for a representative individual % expected and
expected change by state
Variable Labour supply Ration
NP LPT HPT FT UE
Reference 30.68 8.95 10.82 43.01 6.53
YNP + £10 5.72 −0.01 −0.48 −4.68 −0.54
YLPT + £10 0.04 0.38 −0.05 −0.37 0.00
YHPT + £10 −0.56 −0.05 0.63 −0.07 0.05
YFT + £10 −3.40 −0.35 −0.15 3.57 0.32
CHNP + £10 4.05 −0.04 −0.34 −3.28 −0.38
CHLPT + £10 −0.04 0.27 −0.03 −0.20 0.00
CHHPT + £10 −0.39 −0.03 0.39 −0.01 0.04
CHFT + £10 −3.56 −0.20 −0.01 3.44 0.34
FCNP + £10 2.43 −0.02 −0.21 −1.97 −0.23
FCLPT + £10 −0.02 0.16 −0.02 −0.12 0.00
FCHPT + £10 −0.23 −0.02 0.23 0.00 0.02
FCFT + £10 −2.15 −0.12 0.00 2.08 0.20
owner −10.30 3.22 0.20 8.83 −1.96
age + 10 −0.13 0.49 0.54 1.07 −1.98
unemp. + 1% 0.00 0.00 0.00 −0.01 0.01
child 0-4 41.40 −2.08 −7.75 −28.62 −2.60
child 5-10 17.54 2.16 −1.36 −17.48 −0.85
widow 13.19 3.87 −0.71 −13.85 −2.50
Source: Author calculations.
Note: FC = Family Credit; HB = Housing Benefit, CH = child nutrition programmes. Representative individual same as for
Table 5.
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ing in the labour market would increase the probability by 4%. Again it is clear that
child nutrition transfers appear to be much less stigmatized than Family Credit. This
may be a reflection of it being borne by the children rather than the parent in many
cases; or perhaps that it is establishing eligibility for the initial cash transfer that is stig-
matizing and subsequent in-kind transfer participation is less so. Furthermore, most
child nutrition programme recipients (80%) also receive Income Support, and have
lower incomes than Family Credit recipients.
The labour supply simulations in Table 6 indicate low responsiveness to relative in-
come differences at both lower part time and higher part time. Transfers that increase
income in the higher part-time state generally do not reduce the probability of full-
time work. A crude “wage” elasticity can be constructed from the simulated effects –
for example £10 on YNP would constitute approximately a 10% rise and this raises the
NP probability by almost 6% points, or about 20% of the probability for a reference case –
an elasticity of about 2. A £10 rise in YFT (about 8% rise in YFT) raises the probability
of FT by 3.5% points (or about 8%) – an elasticity of about one. However, extending in-
work transfers down to lower part-time is mainly at the expense of full time status. The
last column of Table 6 shows that the unemployment rationing function appears to be
working well. As more women are encouraged to participate by increasing potential in-
work income levels, a larger proportion of individuals are unable to find jobs and
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would bias downwards the labour supply incentive effects.
Table 7 shows simulations of the labour supply effects of eliminating fixed and vari-
able cost stigma from Family Credit and child nutrition programmes. The “own” effects
are again emboldened. Essentially the same type of simulation exercise is performed as
in Table 5 and the differential incentive effects of Family Credit and child nutrition
programme income relative to other income are decomposed. To capture the idea of
eliminating fixed cost stigma, we assume full participation in the transfer programme,
but allow transfer income to have a different impact to other income. When we elimin-
ate variable cost stigma, we assume that transfer income has the same effect as other
income, but we allow for programme non-participation. Without fixed or variable costTable 7 Labour supply effects of stigma and programme non-participation for a
representative individual (% expected by state)
Variable Stigma cost Labour supply Ration
Variable Fixed NP LPT HPT FT UE
Reference 30.68 8.95 10.82 43.01 6.54
CHNP + £10 Y Y 4.05 −0.04 −0.34 −3.28 −0.39
CHLPT + £10 Y Y −0.04 0.27 −0.03 −0.20 0.00
CHHPT + £10 Y Y −0.39 −0.03 0.39 −0.01 0.04
CHFT + £10 Y Y −3.56 −0.20 −0.01 3.44 0.33
CHNP + £10 Y N 5.83 −0.03 −0.50 −4.75 −0.55
CHLPT + £10 Y N −0.27 0.40 −0.04 −0.12 0.03
CHHPT + £10 Y N −0.91 −0.08 0.71 0.19 0.09
CHFT + £10 Y N −3.72 −0.39 −0.17 3.93 0.35
CHNP + £10 N Y 5.47 −0.06 −0.46 −4.44 −0.51
CHLPT + £10 N Y −0.05 0.36 −0.04 −0.28 0.01
CHHPT + £10 N Y −0.53 −0.04 0.53 −0.01 0.05
CHFT + £10 N Y −3.62 −0.28 −0.01 3.46 0.45
FCNP + £10 Y Y 2.43 −0.02 −0.21 −1.97 −0.23
FCLPT + £10 Y Y −0.02 0.16 −0.02 −0.12 0.00
FCHPT + £10 Y Y −0.23 −0.02 0.23 0.00 0.02
FCFT + £10 Y Y −2.15 −0.12 0.00 2.08 0.19
FCNP + £10 Y N 5.41 0.03 −0.43 −4.50 −0.51
FCLPT + £10 Y N 0.92 0.35 −0.10 −1.08 −0.09
FCHPT + £10 Y N 0.44 0.01 0.42 −0.83 −0.04
FCFT + £10 Y N −2.30 −0.22 −0.12 2.42 0.22
FCNP + £10 N Y 3.52 −0.03 −0.30 −2.86 −0.33
FCLPT + £10 N Y −0.03 0.23 −0.03 −0.18 0.01
FCHPT + £10 N Y −0.34 −0.03 0.34 −0.01 0.04
FCFT + £10 N Y −3.11 −0.18 −0.01 3.00 0.30
YNP + £10 N N 5.72 −0.01 −0.48 −4.68 −0.55
YLPT + £10 N N 0.04 0.38 −0.05 −0.37 0.00
YHPT + £10 N N −0.56 −0.05 0.63 −0.07 0.05
YFT + £10 N N −3.40 −0.35 −0.15 3.57 0.33
Source: Author calculations.
Note: FC = Family Credit; HB = Housing Benefit, CH = child nutrition programmes. Representative individual same as for
Table 5.
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other income on labour supply. The fixed and variable cost components of stigma seem
to be of about equal importance in explaining the somewhat weaker incentive effects
on labour supply of child nutrition programmes relative to other income. Whereas for
Family Credit, fixed cost stigma explains most of the associated weaker labour supply
incentive effects. Accounting for both fixed and variable costs stigma and allowing
these to differ across programmes is a new contribution, and one which we find to be
empirically important.7. Conclusions
In 1988 the U.K. reformed the main in-work transfer programmes for low income
households with children: the value of cash transfer entitlements were increased but
conditional eligibility to associated in-kind nutrition programmes for children was
removed. This was a partial cash-out of the in-work in-kind transfers while out-of-work
transfer entitlements were left unchanged.
If we used difference-in-differences estimation it would be difficult to differentiate be-
tween the effects of the loss of in-kind with the gain in cash. Thus, we confine our-
selves to estimating a structural model of labour supply and participation in multiple
transfer programmes using a sample of single mothers drawn from repeated cross-
section surveys that bridge the reform. We find that in-work cash and in-work in-kind
transfers both have large positive labour supply effects. There is, however, some utility
loss from transfer programme participation and this appears to be larger for cash than
for nutrition programmes. This implies that the partial cash out of the in-kind benefits
effectively reduced labour supply. We cannot, however, be definitive on why this
occurs. We have no further information in our data concerning attitudes to the
transfers. Nor does the data bridge any changes in the nature of the transfers that
might allow us to make inferences. On the one hand, this would make our results quite
specific to this context – where the change in cash receipt is experienced by one house-
hold member but the change in in-kind receipts is experienced by another. On the
other hand, it would be quite common for in-kind transfers to be made to some house-
hold members while cash transfers are made to another – because of fear that there
are agency effects associated with making transfers to one person on behalf another.
There is clearly a need for qualitative research in this area to try to unpick the issues.
Our findings have several implications for public policy. First, we show that an in-
crease in transfer entitlements available for part-time work has only a modest impact
on the probability of working part-time, and has essentially no adverse effect on the
probability of full-time work. Expanding transfer entitlements to full-time work has
stronger participation effects. However, increasing the availability of in-work transfers
to those lower down the hours distribution does cause moderate reductions in the
probability of working full-time. This reflects the non-convexities in the budget
constraints faced by single mothers.
Secondly, we find that nutrition transfers are actually more important for labour sup-
ply than the cash equivalent in cash transfer programmes. We interpret this as cash
and in-kind having different values to recipients since our estimates imply that nutri-
tion programmes suffer from only mild stigma/transaction/information costs. Several
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are high transactions costs of claiming these cash transfers, whereas the additional
transactions costs of claiming associated conditional in-kind transfers is relatively small.
Regarding stigma: for cash transfers it is likely that the only others knowing about re-
ceipt were administrating government officials; while knowledge of in-kind transfer re-
ceipt was potentially shared with local shop assistants, in the case of Welfare Milk
Tokens, and with teachers and peers at school, in the case of Free School Lunches. It
seems likely that non-participation in the cash programmes by those who were eligible
was largely driven by imperfect information and the transaction costs of claiming. In
contrast, it seems likely that in-kind transfers may have low value for the household, in
addition to any stigma, but have relatively low information/transaction costs for the
claimant. In the case of Free School Lunches it seems likely that the burden of any
stigma is largely borne by the child. Our results suggest that nutrition transfers may
have a useful role to play in promoting work incentives. The 1988 partial cash-out of
nutrition transfers in-work is thus shown to have reduced labour supply – quite the op-
posite to what was intended.
Third, however, we find evidence of statistically significant, and not inconsiderable,
stigma/ transaction/ information costs which implies that in-work transfers are not as
effective at countering the disincentive effect of out-of-work transfers, or at countering
poverty amongst the working poor, as they might otherwise be. If it were possible to re-
duce these costs associated with transfer programmes, this would have an important
impact on the labour force non-participation rate for single mothers, it would imply
large savings in government expenditure on Income Support payments for those not
working, and it would increase the welfare of those in receipt of transfers. Finally, we
demonstrate that even though there is Pareto-inefficiency associated with in-kind
transfers, such transfers may have a place in the policy portfolio because the alternative
may be an even more inefficient cash transfer programme.
Of course, our estimates are conditional on unobserved attributes of the U.K. transfer
system. Thus, one could not generalize from our estimates to another country. Further-
more, our analysis is not simply cash versus in-kind because the programmes we consider
differ according to whether they are in-work or out-of-work transfers and in-kind nutri-
tion versus in-kind non-nutrition But there is a general point that remains – differential
costs associated with different transfers can easily exist and can make a difference to be-
havior. The U.S. trend of moving away from cash programmes towards in-kind may not
be as inefficient as it first appears, and the estimates here suggest that such differential
costs of in-work transfers might be exploited to raise labour force participation in the U.K.
at no cost to the government. The results also imply that raising the costs of out-of-
work welfare might also promote labour force participation. That is, a policy of cashing
out the eligibility for in-kind transfers for those on out-of-work transfers, instead of those
on in-work cash transfers, would have better served UK work incentives.Endnotes
1 We assume that fertility and marital status are exogenous. Evidence on how respon-
sive these are to welfare is mixed. See, for example, Joyce et al. (2003) on fertility and
Bitler et al. (2004) on marital status.
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http://www.izajole.com/content/2/1/12 See Currie (1996) for an exhaustive review of U.S. in-kind transfers.
3 It is difficult to use data prior to 1978 because of the absence of education informa-
tion, used in the estimation of wage equations, and data beyond 1992 does not contain
appropriate information about housing costs to deal with changes in the local tax sys-
tem that occurred at this time. Moreover, from April 1992 the minimum hours of work
requirement for Family Credit was reduced to 16.
4 The routine is based on the Institute for Fiscal Studies’ TAXBEN computer
programme but deals with all of the changes that have taken place between 1978 and
1992. See Johnson et al. (1990) for details of TAXBEN. Moreover, we allow for wages
to be determined differently across employment states because of the large differential
between part-time and full-time wages rates that is a feature of the U.K. labour market
(see Ermisch and Wright (1991)).
5 Family Credit eligibility is based on a history of hours of work at claim time and
responses to the “usual hours worked” question might not match the required history.
However, it seems likely to be better than using current hours of work because current
receipt will depend on hours of work in the past when eligibility was established - usual
hours may better capture this. Furthermore, our eligibility and programme participation
measures calculated on this basis seem to fit well with published aggregates.
6 We choose 10 rather than 0 because a small number of single parents do record
very low levels of hours which we think is associated with casual activity such as baby-
minding. Our estimates are not sensitive to the precise definition of non-participation.
The Income Support system does incorporate an “earnings disregard” that allows small
amounts of income to be earned without affecting Income Support entitlement.
7 In the case of Family Credit there is a small proportion of the not entitled who are
receiving (2.5%) and this arises because there is no requirement to report changes in
circumstances once eligibility is established and eligibility lasts for 6 months before it
needs to be re-assessed. For CH there are further measurement difficulties: the reform
resulted in a delay of up to six months while those who were in receipt of Family Credit
got reassessed and then lost their conditional eligibility to CH transfers; there was some
local authority discretion in the provision of nutrition transfers to children at school;
and disabled children may be eligible but we cannot observe this in our data. Together
these factors probably account for most of the ineligible CH participants. Housing
Benefit has the largest proportion of participating ineligibles (9.3%). Fry and Stark
(1993) point out that this is largely because of processing delays that resulted in
payments being made in arrears so that some households are currently observed to be
in receipt for Housing Benefit but not entitled on the basis of current circumstances.
This measurement error is unlikely to be correlated with our measures of other sources
of income, but will reduce the precision of our Housing Benefit participation estimates.
8 Only 1% record receipt of Income Support and Family Credit at the same time, and
just 6% record Income Support and HB. Table 3 shows small numbers on Family Credit
who have a labour market status of UE or NP which is inconsistent. In our econometric
analysis we respect the observed data but because we assume that choices depend on
levels of entitlements we will be unlikely to predict someone choosing a point of zero
entitlement. Note that we treat Income Support as equivalent to non-transfer income;
but some individuals who record themselves as UE or NP receive Unemployment
Benefit (sometimes plus Housing Benefit) rather than Income Support. Unemployment
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http://www.izajole.com/content/2/1/1Benefit is conditional on searching for work but is not actually means tested. Thus, sin-
gle parents with some asset income, perhaps child support (although this was rather
uncommon during this period), might be better off on Unemployment Benefit and
Housing Benefit than on Income Support. Since we treat Income Support as equivalent
to non-transfer income, and since Income Support and Unemployment Benefit are ef-
fectively interchangeable, since there was no obligation to search for this group, we
treat Unemployment Benefit and Income Support as equivalent.
9 Recall that Income Support receipt is not included in Table 3. Consequently mul-
tiple receipts are understated, for example, 80% of CH recipients also receive Income
Support.
10 The specification for the determination of wages is logwhi ¼ Zhi γh þ ehi where h
stands for part time (both higher and lower) and full time work. We estimate the wage
equations by including the Mills Ratios from a Bivariate Probit model of participation
vs. non-participation and full-time vs. part-time work conditional on participation. We
include the level of unearned income in the reduced form labour force status equations
but not in the wage equations to achieve identification. Other covariates included in
the reduced from selection and wage equations are education, a quadratic in experi-
ence, numbers and ages of children, region and year dummies. MaCurdy et al. (1990)
show that inconsistent estimates may result from using predicted gross wages in a
non-linear second stage labour supply equation. One solution is to integrate out the
prediction error in the wage equations, at the cost of increasing the dimensionality of
the estimation problem. Van Soest (1995) does this for the Netherlands, on top of a
much simpler logit structure, and finds labour supply elasticities to be unchanged.
11 We compute their incomes at 6, 16, 26, and 36 hours.
12 The Family expenditure data we have access to contains hours of work, and for
those with zero hours of work, whether or not they are unemployed (i.e. seeking work).
We model hours of work as a choice between four discrete alternatives: non-
participation, low hours part-time, high hours part-time and full time work. For those
who are not unemployed, we assume that they are observed in their most preferred
labour market state. For those with zero hours who are unemployed, we assume they
reveal themselves to not be in their most preferred labour market state. Note that we
are not introducing a new discrete alternative. We use the information on unemploy-
ment to distinguish among the preference orderings of those working zero hours: that
the unemployed would rather be working at the going wage rate, so zero hours is not
the most preferred labour market state for the unemployed. In doing this we follow
Blundell et al. (1987) and others who use this information to discriminate between
non-participation and unemployment. This is important because women who are un-
employed are not observed to be in their most preferred state, and must be classified
appropriately in a choice model. For the purposes of labour supply modeling this group
is assumed to reveal, by stating that they are searching for work, that some positive
hours state is preferred to zero. Furthermore, individuals observed in any positive hours
labour market state are assumed to prefer their observed state to all alternatives and are
not rationed in exercising this preference. They are distinguished by the following reduced
form latent and observed unemployment rationing equations Ri ¼ 1 if Ri ≡Ziτþ υi > 0;
and 0 otherwise, where R* is the latent variable describing the rationing process, and Ri is
the observed outcome, which we define to be unity if i is observed to be not working and
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τ is a corresponding vector of parameters, and υi is a random error. While this is an ex-
tension that has not previously been considered in the literature concerned with joint
labour supply and programme participation, we consider it important here because we
would otherwise understate the extent of programme non-participation.
13 In common with the literature, we do not take into account errors in classification
which may arise through mis-measurement of transfer receipt or errors in calculating
eligibility. We appeal to our good match with aggregate data and our adoption of
precise entitlement calculations to support this. See Poterba and Summers (1995) for a
treatment of errors in classification in the context of unemployment transitions.
14 Ideally we would unbundle Income Support receipt from other sources of un-
earned income at zero hours in order to distinguish programme participation costs.
However we lack variation in Income Support programme participation in our data in
order to identify such a distinction.
15 The choice of g(.) is arbitrary. Brewer et al. (2007) use a quadratic utility function
in their analysis of the successor programme to Family Credit, but here we find that a
linear local approximation can be accepted.
16 This would not be the case if programme participation impacted directly on labour
supply apart from through the budget constraint – for example, if claiming a transfer
took a lot of time and this reduced labour supply. We ignore this possibility here be-
cause once a claim is made the eligibility lasts for 6 months unless circumstances
change. So claiming and reclaiming is infrequent and will have little effect on an aver-
age week.
17 Non-separability means that programme incomes directly affect labour market sta-
tus in addition to its effect through income levels at each state. Note from Equation (5)
that although the terms in individual characteristics cancel out, the error terms do not.
These terms carry through into the variance of the labour supply function (see the Ap-
pendix available online, or from the authors on request).
18 The sensitivity of the labour supply model estimates to the hours grouping was
tested. Parameters were not significantly affected by altering the lower part time and
higher part time criteria, until higher part time reaches 35 hours, which effectively
brought the fulltime hours of work peak into the higher part time range.
19 The rationing equation contains year and region effects and the regional unemploy-
ment rate data features relatively little relative variation so it is not very surprising that it
does not appear significant in the rationing equation. Nonetheless, we feel it appropriate
to allow for the distinction in the model because whether individuals declare themselves
as UE or NP will still depend on the financial attractiveness of working – which we dem-
onstrate in a later simulation.
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